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Chapter I: Introduction  
 
1.1 Background 
A Jus cogens is a hierarchically superior norm ‘from which no derogation is 
permitted’.1 This peremptory norm suggests that there is a hierarchy among rules 
relating to international law. As such the recent trend of placing human rights norms 
in the catalogue of jus cogens has had a significant impact on both domestic and 
international law. For instance, in Barcelona Traction, Light and power Co, Ltd 
(Belgium v Spain),2 the International Court of Justice (ICJ), when making a 
distinction between the obligation of states towards the international community as 
whole and those arising vis-à-vis another state, held that the former are obligation 
erga omnes in view of their importance.3  
 
In Prosecutor v Anto Furundzija,4 the court held: ‘Because of the importance of the 
values it protects, [the prohibition of torture] has evolved into a peremptory norm or 
jus cogens, that is, a norm that enjoys a higher rank in the international hierarchy 
than treaty law and even 'ordinary' customary rules.’5 Also, in Ex Parte Pinochet,6 
the House of Lords had to decide whether to recognise criminal jurisdictional 
immunity for the former President of Chile, General Augusto Pinochet Ugarte.7 The 
Lords decided that the international legal system could not confer immunity ratione 
materiae on heads of state regarding criminal jurisdiction for official acts of torture,8 
since it is precisely these acts that it intends to criminalize as violations of 
fundamental norms of the international community.9 The Pinochet case 
                                               
1
 Article 53 of the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties (1969). 
2
 Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co, Ltd (new application: 1962) (Belgium v Spain). 
3
 Ibid. 
4
 Prosecutor v Anto Furundzija (Trial Judgment). IT-95-17/1-T. International Criminal Tribunal for 
the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). 10 December 1998. 
5
 Ibid. 
6
 Regina v Bow street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, Ex Parte Pinochet Ugarte (Hereinafter 
Pinochet case) (1999). 
7
 Ibid. 
8
 The difference between ratione personae immunity and ratione materiae immunity is also present in 
diplomatic immunities, as can be seen in the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, opened for 
signature 18 April 1961, 500 UNTS 95, and art 39(2) (entered into force 24 April 1964). 
9
 For further details on Pinochet see Günther Handl ‘The Pinochet Case, Foreign State Immunity and 
the Changing Constitution of the International Community’ in Wolfgang Benedek, Hubert Isak and 
Renate Kicker (eds), Development and Developing International and European Law: Essays in 
Honour of Konrad Ginther on the Occasion of His 65th Birthday (1999) 79. 
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demonstrated that it was not possible to grant jurisdictional immunity to a head of 
state who had allegedly violated the jus cogens norm of torture.  
 
In Prefecture of voitotia v Federal Republic of Germany,10 which concerned 
reparations for atrocities and destruction of private property committed by the 
German occupation forces in the village of Distomo during the Second World War, 
the Hellenic Supreme Court decided that when a state breaches a peremptory norm it 
waives its entitlement to sovereign immunity for those breaches.11  
 
In 1994, the Federal Government (Federal Council) of Switzerland declared that the 
refugee right to non-refoulement had acquired the status of a jus cogens norm.12 
Consequently, states are under an obligation to refrain from extraditing persons to a 
country where they may face cruel and degrading treatment. In Al-adsani v United 
Kingdom, the dissenting judges rejected the view of state immunity as a bar, and held 
that the jus cogens norm of prohibition of torture prevailed over state immunity.13 In 
this connection, Kuwait, the defendant state, could not hide behind hierarchically 
lower rules to avoid the consequences of its actions. The examples above 
demonstrate the attitude of the international community towards human rights rules 
of jus cogens. 
 
The notion of jus cogens in international law is founded in the Vienna Convention of 
the Law of Treaty.14 Article 53 of this instrument stipulates that a treaty is void if it 
conflicts with a peremptory norm of general international law. According to the 
Vienna Convention, ‘a peremptory norm of international law is a norm accepted and 
recognized by the international community as whole as a norm from which no 
derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of 
general international law having the same character’.15 
 
                                               
10
 Prefecture of Voitotia v Federal Republic of Germany, case no 11/2000 Areijos Pagos (Hellenic, 
Supreme Court) 4TH May 2000. 
11
 Ibid. 
12
 Both Chambers of the Federal Parliament declared the People’s Initiatives Invalid. See Erika de 
Wet  ‘The Prohibition of Torture as an International Norm of Jus Cogens and its Implications for 
National and Customary Law’ (2004)  15 ( 1)  European Journal of International Law 97-121. 
13
 Dissenting Opinion of Judges Rozakis, Caflisch, Costa, Cabral Barreto, and Vajic. 
14
 Ibid. 
15
 Vienna Convention article 53. 
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It must be said that the hierarchy theory seeks to establish cohesion in international 
law in order to ‘avoid any subsequent conflict of norms’.16 In fact, the effectiveness 
of any legal system depends on its coherence. Thus, any legal order is characterized 
by ‘general and individual rules and by the existence of a ranking order of 
characters’.17 As a result, a norm that assumes the status of jus cogens takes 
precedence over others. Therefore, where a conflict occurs between a peremptory 
norm and an ordinary norm, the former prevails. Jus cogens can also be described as 
norms ‘accepted by the international community as whole’,18 and by extension, a 
norm elevated to jus cogens becomes universally accepted.  
 
However, as human rights are defined as indivisible, interrelated and interdependent, 
one would be hard pressed to justify such a theory. Indeed, the indivisibility of 
human rights renders the use of the normative hierarchy theory contentious in the 
field of human rights law. The International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural rights (ICCESC)19 and the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR)20 each recognise the importance of their counterpart in the preamble.   
 
Even more clearly, the First World Conference on Human Rights in Teheran (1968) 
proclaimed that ‘human rights and fundamental freedoms are indivisible.’ It is 
common cause that the realisation of each human right requires other human rights 
and, in this sense, all human rights are indivisible. This notion has been strengthened, 
for instance by article 6 of the Declaration on Right to Development (1986) and 
paragraph 5 of the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action (1993) adopted at 
the second World Conference on Human rights.  
 
The indivisibility of human rights means that none of the rights that are considered to 
be fundamental human rights is more important than others, more specifically; they 
                                               
16
 Langhmani  ‘Le Jus Cogens et la Coherence de L’ordre Juridique International’  in Les Droits de 
L’homme: Une Nouvelle pour le Droit International ? ‘ VII Colloque de Tunis (2007) 12 Tunisian 
Journal International Law 23-45.  
17
 Ibid. 
18
 Article 53 Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties. 
19
 G.A. res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 993 
U.N.T.S. 3, entered into force Jan. 3, 1976. 
20
 G.A. res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 
U.N.T.S. 171, entered into force Mar. 23, 1976. 
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are inter-related.21 Put differently, the indivisibility of human rights does not admit 
that ‘specific human rights’ can have hierarchical status and particular human rights 
norms may be selected, as more important than others. In this vein, the concept of 
indivisibility and interdependence ‘appears to be incompatible with any notion of 
hierarchy’.22 In addition, the idea of indivisibility of human rights complies with ‘the 
traditional international spirit of respect for diverse cultural values by avoiding 
priorities in the domain of human rights norms’.23 Consequently, while international 
practice increasingly recognizes emerging hierarchies, traditional human rights 
principles seem to be inconsistent with the new trend.   
 
1.2 Research question  
This study seeks to discuss whether it is possible to apply the normative hierarchy 
theory in human rights. More precisely, do the traditional principles of human rights 
admit the use of normative theory in human rights law? If so how do jus cogens 
influence human rights?  
 
1.3 Research methodology 
This is a desktop-based research project. A critical analysis using literature and case 
studies will be employed.  
 
1.4 Literature review  
Many scholars have discussed the use of the normative hierarchy theory in relation to 
human rights. Seiderman, for instance, concedes, in his ‘Hierarchy in International 
law, the Human Rights Dimension’, that although human rights purport to be 
indivisible, interdependent, and interrelated, and by implication, normatively equal, 
an appraisal of the variable priorities accorded to certain rights and more precisely to 
humanitarian norms in international law calls into the question this unitary 
paradigm.24 Further, Seideman argues that although most states have not accepted all 
obligations stemming from human rights and humanitarian law, international practice 
                                               
21Bunch and Frost ‘Women’s Human Rights: An Introduction’ in the Routledge international 
Encyclopedia of Women global Women’s issues and Knowledge Eds (2000). 
22
  Koji Teraya ‘Emerging Hierarchy in International Human Rights and Beyond: From the 
Perspective of Non-derogable Rights’ (2001) 12 European Journal of International Law 918. 
23
 Ibid. 
24
 Seiderman Hierarchy in International law. The Human rights Dimension. Eds Intersentia –Hart 
(2001) pp54. 
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has demonstrated that the strength of those norms vary according to the value 
attached to the corresponding norm.  
 
Teraya Koji agrees that most human rights studies do not recognize the use of the 
normative hierarchy theory because of their focus on the indivisibility of human 
rights.25 Nevertheless, Koji acknowledges the existence of a possible hierarchy in 
human rights from the perspective of non-derogable rights. Similarly, Theodor 
Meron argues that the march towards ranking of certain human rights as 
hierarchically superior may be justified by the fact that there is a proliferation of 
human rights instruments, sometimes of poor quality and uncertain legal value.26  
 
Therefore, it is important that attempts are made to upgrade other rights by giving 
them various quality labels on the assumption that the authority of the higher right 
will not be impugned. Furthermore, Meron notes that the hierarchy theory is also 
used to categorise rights into so-called first generation (civil and political rights), 
second generation (economic, social and cultural rights) and third generation 
(solidarity rights, right to peace, development and protected environment). 
 
1.5 Limitations of the study 
The normative hierarchy theory is a diverse concept encompassing a wide range of 
areas. The study, therefore, will focus on well-known jurisprudence in international 
law where jus cogens and ordinary norms conflict. However, in assessing the 
compatibility of ordinary norms with peremptory norms it may not be possible to 
exhaustively deal with all matters. Hence, although the study will assess the 
jurisprudence, it will mainly focus on the use of the normative theory in human 
rights. Furthermore, the thesis will discuss how application of the hierarchy impacts 
on human rights law.  
 
1.6 Overview of chapters  
                                               
25
  Teraya ( see footnote 22) p 917. 
26
 Meron ‘On a Hierarchy of International Human Rights’ (1986) 80 American Journal of 
International Law 1.  
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Chapter one highlights the basis and structure of the entire study. Chapter two 
presents a brief historical evolution as well as conceptual framework of the jus 
cogens theory. Chapter three focuses on the international practice and jurisprudence 
of international law with regard to issues raised by the application of jus cogens 
norms. This chapter will also analyze in particular the issues raised by the use of the 
normative hierarchy theory in human rights and whether such issues may lead to the 
rejection or admission of jus cogens in human rights. It will also discuss how jus 
congens influence national law. Chapter four focuses on the normative theory and 
human rights. This chapter will demonstrate how the normative hierarchy theory is 
important in a legal system. More precisely, how the theory influences human rights. 
Chapter five concludes the study and makes recommendations. 
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Chapter II: Meaning and nature of jus cogens  
2.1 Introduction  
Jus cogens, which literally means ‘compelling law’ has for centuries been recognized 
in international relations although it started receiving more attention after the 
inception of the 1969 Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties (Vienna 
Convention). This is despite the controversy surrounding its sources and the current 
common view that ‘certain overriding principles of international law exist’ which 
form jus cogens.27 The Vienna Convention does not precisely say how an ordinary 
norm may acquire the status of jus cogens.  
 
Nevertheless, article 53 of the Vienna Conventions enumerates certain elements 
which may lead to the identification of peremptory norms. Despite controversies 
related to its definition, sources and identification; its function of limiting the 
autonomy of states from contracting out of certain rules of law is significant in 
international law. The following points will be analyzed in detail: the history of the 
concept of peremptory norms; definition of jus cogens; sources of jus congens; and 
how one can identify a peremptory norm or elements of jus cogens norms, jus cogens 
and related concepts; and the function of jus cogens. 
 
2.2 History of jus cogens norms 
2.2.1 Early conception of jus cogens  
The origins of jus cogens can be traced back to the early part of the 20th century.28 
However, the concept was not used with any degree of consistency in the practice of 
states and by international tribunals before the adoption of the Vienna Convention. 
Some commentators have suggested that the ancient Roman law jus strictum 
(obligatory law) and jus dispositum (voluntary law)29 and the maxim jus publicum 
privatorum pactis mutari non potest, were the precursors of the term  jus cogens 
                                               
27
 Nieto-Navia  ‘International  Peremptory Norms (Jus Cogens) and  International Humanitarian Law ’ 
In Man’ Inhumanity to Man  Essay of International Law in Honor of Antonion Cassese  edited by Lal 
Chand Vorhah et alii (2003) pp 28. 
28
 Ragazzi   The Concept of International Obligations Erga Omnens Oxford press (1997) pp 23. 
29
 Frowein Jus cogens ,in MAX PLANCK  Encyclopedia of Public international Law vii at 327 (1984) 
pp 229. 
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although it was not itself apparently applied in ancient law.30 Some natural law 
theorists of the 17th and 18th centuries emphasized the view that certain laws exist 
timelessly and beyond the will of states and that such law supersede and delimit any 
other laws which states might wish to adopt additionally.31 
 
It is noteworthy that before the Vienna Convention a jus cogens norm was linked to 
natural law. Grotius and other classical writers held, for instance, the view that 
certain ‘principles’32 amounted to a jus naturale necessarium (necessary natural law). 
Wolff33 and Vattel34 stated that there existed ‘necessary law’ which was natural to all 
States and that all treaties and customs, which contravened this ‘necessary law’, were 
illegal.  Founded on the basis of natural law, peremptory norms during this arena 
ignored conventional sources. Thus jus cogens were introduced as part of ‘positive’ 
laws accepted and recognized by the international community.35 
 
2.2.2 The recognition of jus cogens by Vienna Convention  
Jus cogens is based on the prevailing view that ‘there existed within the international 
community overriding binding laws or principles, violation of which could render 
illegal the object of a particular treaty’.36 It is important to note that the Vienna 
Convention’s version of this theory was conceived by the International Law 
Commission (ILC) and its rapporteurs37 primarily to declare illegal any treaty 
conflicting with international norms.38  Initially, this invalidity could only be 
pronounced by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) although Article 53 of the 
final text invokes invalidity of a treaty when ‘at the time of its conclusion conflicts 
with a peremptory norm of general international law’. Thus International community 
does not need the findings of the ICJ before declaring a treaty which does not comply 
with peremptory norms of general international law as a nullity.  Fitzmaurice, one of 
                                               
30
 Sinclair The Vienna Convention of the Law of treaties (the Melland Schill Lectures (Unknown 
Binding) (1973) pp 35. 
31
 Seiderman (footnote 24) pp36.  
32
 Knasas   Being and Some Twentieth-Century Thomists Fordham University Press (2003). 
33Wollf ‘Jus gentium’, Encyclopedia Britannica. Available at 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/308663/Jus-gentium (accessed 23 March 2009). 
34Vattel  ‘The Law of Nations’ (1758) Encyclopædia Britannica. Available at 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/624086/Emmerich-de-Vattel. (accessed 28 March 2009). 
35
 Nieto-Navia  (footnote 26) pp 5. 
36
 Ibid. 
37
 Seiderman ( footnote 24) pp 41. 
38
 Ibid. 
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the early rapporteurs, submits that ‘certain types of general international law’39 have 
the effect of invalidating a treaty. These principles of general international law 
include ‘rules instituted for the protection of the individual, planning of wars of 
aggression, and agreements connected with piracy’.40  
 
2.3 Definition of jus cogens and difficulties arising from the concept 
2.3.1 Definitions  
The Vienna Convention does not explicitly define jus cogens. Article 53 of the 
Vienna Convention instead enumerates the conditions that norms should fill in order 
to qualify as peremptory norms. Article 53 reads:  
 
A Treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a 
peremptory norm of general international law.  For the purposes of the 
present Convention, a peremptory norm of general international law is a norm 
accepted and recognized by    international community of states as whole as a 
norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only 
by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same 
character.41 
 
2.3.2 Difficulties arising from the concept 
Seiderman argues that the textual reading of article 53 reveals a tautological 
construction.42 Accordingly ‘the principle of non-derogability’ might be defined by 
making ‘reference to its peremptory quality’.43 Furthermore, he argues that article 53 
is susceptible to criticism because it identifies peremptory norms by their legal 
effects rather than their object and quality. In my view the tautological construction 
of article 53 does not affect the definition of a peremptory norm; it rather strengthens 
its validity in international law. In other words, one can understand this concept by 
looking at the conditions enumerated in article 53. 
 
                                               
39
  Ibid  pp 42. 
40
 Ibid.  
41
 Article 53 of the Vienna Convention of law of treaties (1969). 
42
 Seiderman  (footnote 24) pp 40. 
43
 Ibid.  
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Crucially, the ILC also acknowledges the difficulties associated with the concept. For 
example, it has submitted that ‘[t]he formulation of the article is not free from 
difficulty, since there is no simple criterion by which to identify a general rule of 
international law as having the character of jus cogens. In addition the majority of the 
general rules of international law do not have that character, and states may contract 
out of them by treaty’.44 
 
During the debate at the Vienna Conference, French delegate M. Hubert45 was 
critical of article 53, arguing that ‘his delegation was not prepared to take a leap in 
the dark and to accept a provision which, because it failed to establish sufficiently 
precise criteria, opened the door to doubt and compulsion’.46 
 
In spite of this criticism, the majority of states at the conference recognized the 
existence of jus cogens in international law and it was on this basis that article 53 of 
the Vienna Convention was adopted.47 Since the adoption of the Vienna Convention, 
it is common cause that the international community as whole has continued to 
recognize the existence of these norms through agreement or unilaterally. As a 
consequence, it is important to note that the definition agreed upon at the Vienna 
Convention is probably more than simply valid for the purpose of the Convention 
and is rather valid as a definition of the concept for the general purpose of 
international law.48 
 
2.4 Sources of jus cogens 
Scholars remain divided as to what constitutes a peremptory norm and how a given 
norm may rise to that level.49 One of these differences is related to the sources of jus 
cogens. Certain commentators consider that treaties may be sources of jus cogens,50 
while others consider custom to be the source of jus cogens.51 In light of the different 
                                               
44
 Vol. II, ILC Yearbook (1996), pp. 247-248. 
45
 France eventually voted against the inclusion of final Article 53. 
46
 A/CONF.39/11/Add.1, p. 95, no. 18 
47
 Report of the Sixth Committee to the General Assembly during the eighteenth period of sessions 
(1963), UN Doc. A/5601.  
48
 Nieto-Navia (footnote 26) pp 6. 
49
 Bassiouni ‘International Crimes Jus Cogens and Obligation Erga Omnes’ (1996) 59 Journal of Law 
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views related to the sources of jus cogens, the ILC has stated that ‘it is not the form 
of general rule of international law but the particular nature of the subject matter with 
which it deals….[which] gives it the character of jus cogens’.52 Despite the absence 
of consensus, one can discern jus cogens norms from the following sources: 
 
2.4.1 Treaties as sources of jus cogens   
Treaty law is the chief source of positive international law. In fact, international law 
is governed by the principle of sovereignty of states thus norms expressly consented 
to may bind parties to them.53 For instance, article 34 of the Vienna Convention 
stipulates that ‘a treaty does not create either obligation or rights for the third state 
without its consent’. 
 
Considering the principle of states’ consent, treaties may not be considered as 
sources of jus cogens. This theory is supported by those who view treaties as lacking 
adherence.  For example, Hannikainem argues that ‘treaties do not give rise to 
obligations of any kind, much less to those imperative natures, for states that are not 
parties thereto’.54 Furthermore, he states that a state party to the convention may, in 
respect of certain treaties, denounce a prior acceptance.55  
 
Consequently, any denunciation of a treaty by a state party may automatically impact 
on jus cogens. This view is, however, not free from criticism. Prima facie, universal 
acceptance of a norm does not elevate it to the status of a peremptory norm.  As 
Rozakis notes the non participation of a state in a particular convention does not 
mean that it has not accepted it.56 Secondly, states cannot use their sovereignty to 
deny the binding nature of ‘conventions or treaties whose objects and purposes 
render them important’.57 In fact, those conventions acquire the status of general 
international law. As previously held, general international law is binding on most, if 
                                               
52
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not all, states. In this connection, a treaty rule may be elevated in status to a 
peremptory norm, if it satisfies the requirements of   jus cogens.   
 
2.4.2 Custom as source of jus cogens  
Customary international law is constituted by rules of law ‘derived from the 
consistent conduct of states acting out of the belief that the law required them to act 
that way’.58 It follows from this definition that customary law requires a ‘widespread 
repetition by states of similar international acts over time’.59 It is imperative to 
underline that the acts must be taken by ‘a significant number of states and not be 
rejected by a significant number of states’.60  
From this definition one notices the resemblance between customary law and jus 
cogens in the sense that both require acceptance and recognition as rules of general 
law. Nevertheless, the only criterion distinguishing them is that jus cogens requires a 
‘double consent’61: a rule must not only be recognized and accepted as general 
principle of international law, but  must also be recognized as peremptory norm.. 
While some commentators support the view that customary law is more likely to be 
considered as a source of jus cogens, Rozakis, however, postulates that customary 
law has inherent disabilities.62 He argues that customary law requires more time to be 
consolidated, contrary to conventional rules which become binding once the 
instrument comes into force. Consequently, it would be difficult for customary law to 
assist the international community when seized with an urgent need for a solution to 
a current problem.   
The second objection, he emphasises that customary rules are often general and 
vague because their nature as unwritten law makes it difficult to resolve specific 
problems. However, although conventional law provides rules accepted by the 
majority of members of the international community in record time, it is often a 
drawback on present customary law. In other words, customary law contributes to 
the elaboration of conventional law.  
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2.4.3 General principle as sources of jus cogens 
General principles of international law emanate from municipal law. Article 38(1) (c) 
of Statute of the ICJ, for example, speaks of general principles ‘recognised’ by states. 
An area that demonstrates the adoption of municipal approaches is the law applied to 
the relationship between international officials and their employing organisations, 
although today the principles are regarded as established international law. 
Thus today, principles such as pacta sunt servanda, non-retroactivity of criminal law 
are considered as jus cogens norms. What is important to retain concerning general 
principles of international laws as sources of jus cogens is that the identified 
principle must be of a general scope or admitted as a general principle of 
international law. In fact general acceptance and recognition of a new peremptory 
norm is relevant for its very existence.  
In this connection, it is instructive to note that the quest of determining sources of jus 
cogens does not appear impressive, for certain reasons. The first is that jus cogens 
come from different sources of law; it may be conventional, customary or general 
principles of international law. In other words, all of them may produce jus cogens 
norms.  
Despite its natural law origins, jus cogens norms are part of positive law, today. The 
second reason concerns the interests of the international community as a whole. Thus 
a norm created by these different sources must deal with ‘a question of general 
interest for the international community’.63 Another important observation is that jus 
cogens theory introduces a hierarchy of norms rather than a hierarchy of sources.  
Consequently, there is no hierarchy of sources of peremptory norms. Thus a 
conventional jus cogens may be modified by a customary jus cogens or vice versa, as 
long as the new peremptory norm satisfies the requirements of article 53 of the 
Vienna Convention. However, all of these sources of peremptory norms concern the 
interests of the international community as whole.    
2.5 Elements of jus cogens norms 
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The identification of jus cogens remains complex as noted in the final commentary of 
the ILC draft that ‘the formulation of the article is not free from difficulty since there 
is no criterion by which to identify a general rule of international law as having the 
character of jus cogens…’.64  
 
Despite such a controversy, the elements identifying jus cogens norms may be drawn 
from article 53 of the Vienna Convention. Hence, from this article three conditions 
can be discerned as constituting the status of jus cogens norm: 
 
2.5.1. The norm must be a norm of general international law 
A jus cogens must be a norm of general international, in the sense that general 
international law is ‘binding on most, if not all, states’.65 Nonetheless, this rule is not 
exclusive to jus cogens only. Other norms of international law are also predicated on 
the general international law requirement for their existence. For instance, customary 
law rule should be a general rule of international law for it to be recognized in 
international law. 
 
Nevertheless, this can be distinguished from both regional law, which is only binding 
upon states from an identified geographical region and particular traits of 
international law that is only binding on a few states. Even here, the controversy 
persists. This is because the practice of states demonstrates that regional 
communities have the power to elevate an ordinary norm to a jus cogens norms. For 
instance, the right to a name is considered as jus cogens in the American system, 
while certain regions do not recognize it as such.66 
 
Schwarzenberg, considered the possibility of the existence of jus cogens inter partes, 
that is, norms of jus cogens having a limited effect only between identified or 
signatory parties.67 Such a notion was based upon the requirement that ‘every treaty 
in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith 
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(pacta sunt servanda)’.68 However, such a norm is limited only between states 
parties to it.   
 
Despite the fact that not all norms of general international law have the character of 
jus cogens, ‘the criterion for the rules of jus cogens consists in the fact that they do 
not exist to satisfy the need of individuals states but the higher interest of the whole 
international community’.69  More importantly, the difference between a customary 
norm and jus cogens is underlined by the fact that the former does not bind states 
without their consent, while jus cogens bind member states without their consent.   
 
2.5.2. The norm must be accepted and recognized by international community 
of states as whole. 
A norm must be accepted and recognized by the international community as a whole. 
The term ‘as whole’ is significant, in the sense that it avoids ‘a situation whereby one 
state could effectively veto a decision to designate a norm as peremptory’.70 As 
Yasseen, the Chairman of the Drafting committee at the Vienna Conference, 
observed: 
…there was no question of requiring a rule to be accepted and recognized as 
peremptory by all States. It would be enough if a very large majority did so; 
that would mean that, if one State in isolation refused to accept the 
peremptory character of a rule, or if that State was supported by a very small 
number of States, the acceptance and recognition of the peremptory character 
of the rule by the international community as a whole would not be 
affected.71 
 
In practice, this entails that the will of the majority prevails over the minority. Thus 
the requirement is satisfied once a large number of states accept and recognize a rule 
as a peremptory norm. However, ‘recognition by the international community is not 
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merely the mechanism whereby an ordinary norm becomes a peremptory norm, but 
also the mechanism whereby even general rules of international law are made’.72 
 
Crucially, the minority of states or ‘some subjects of international law, acting alone 
or in conjunction with others’73 cannot establish a jus cogens norm and impose their 
construction upon the majority of states. Consequently, the minority of member 
states of international community ‘cannot in theory veto a decision taken by a 
majority of states’.74Therefore, a norm ‘accepted and recognized by the international 
community as a whole’ acquires the status of a non-derivable right.75 
 
2.5.3. The norm must be one from which non-derogation is permitted 
Having considered the definition of jus cogens, it seems to me that this is the main 
character of a norm of jus cogens. As previously mentioned, a jus cogens norm 
encompasses the notion of a peremptory norm. Even though, this statement may not 
be free from criticism, it is established that most of jus cogens norms, if not all, are 
non-derogable rights. Thus the following norms do not permit derogation: the right to 
life, the prohibition of torture, the prohibition of cruel and degrading treatment, 
apartheid and the non-retroactivity of criminal law. However, it is always easier to 
‘illustrate these rules than define them’:76 the reason may be that apart from its 
definition jus cogens remain a controversial notion. This may also be because jus 
cogens norms come from different sources which are not considered to be at par in 
international law.  
 
2.6 Jus cogens and related concepts  
2.6.1 Jus cogens and obligation erga omnes  
The erga omnes and jus cogens concepts are often presented as two sides of the same 
coin. In the absence of a clear definition, scholars have often sought to define erga 
omnes by making reference to the notion of peremptory norms, jus cogens.77 The 
term erga omnes means ‘flowing to all’, and so obligations deriving from jus cogens 
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are presumably erga omnes.78 Indeed, legal logic supports the proposition that what 
is ‘compelling law’ must necessarily engender an obligation ‘flowing to all’.79  
The problem with such a simplistic formulation is that it is circular. What ‘flows to 
all’ means obligation erga omnes is ‘compelling’ like jus cogens. The difficulty is 
apparent in the senses that if all jus cogens norms are erga omnes, are all erga omnes 
norms jus cogens. The answer to this question seems to be in the negative. In fact, 
there are certain norms generally recognized and accepted by the international 
community as a whole but which are not elevated to the status of jus cogens norms. 
This is the case with general principles of diplomatic immunity and the principle of 
sovereignty of states in international agreements although the list is not exhaustive. 
The relationship between jus cogens and obligation erga omnes was never clearly 
articulated by the PCIJ and the ICJ, nor did the jurisprudence of either court 
explicitly articulate how a given norm becomes jus cogens, or why and when it 
becomes erga omnes and what consequences derive from this. Obviously, a jus 
cogens norm rises to that level when the principle ‘it embodies has been universally 
accepted, through consistent practice accompanied by the necessary opinio juris, by 
most states’.80 
It is imperative to mention that all jus cogens norms are erga omnes, but not all erga 
omnes norms are jus cogens. Jus cogens concerns the value of norms, while erga 
omnes describe the scope or extent of such norms.  
 
2.6.2 Jus cogens and non derogable rights  
There is a common understanding that human rights are interdependent, interrelated 
and indivisible. The Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action of 1993 affirmed 
this basic characteristic of human rights.81 For effective realisation of human rights, 
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all rights should be protected on an equal footing. However, in a state of emergency 
most rights can be suspended for the same purpose of protecting the nation.82 
 
The International Covenant on Political and Civil Rights (ICCPR),83 the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
(ECHR)84 and the American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR)85 each contain 
provisions allowing states parties to derogate from their obligations in respect of 
specified rights during declared states of emergency. At the same time, these 
instruments provide that a select group of enumerated rights may never be suspended 
or limited, even during such times of national emergency.  
 
The ICCPR, for instance provides a limited number of non-derogable rights namely: 
the right to life (article 6), freedom from torture, or cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment (article 7), freedom from slavery and servitude (article 8), 
freedom from imprisonment merely on the ground of inability to fulfill a contractual 
obligation (article 11), freedom from retroactive criminal liability (nullum crimen 
sine lege) (article 15), the right to recognition as a person before the law (article 16), 
and the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion( article 18). 
 
On the face of it, non-derogable rights like jus cogens do not admit of derogations. 
Nonetheless, all non-derogable rights are recognized as the residuum in the wake of a 
states declaration of the intention to suspend identified human rights norms.86 On the 
other hand, certain jus cogens norms are derogable in times of emergency. The jus 
cogens right to non-retroactivity of penal law, for instance, may be placed in 
abeyance in times of national or international emergencies. This also applies to the 
jus cogens norm of non-refoulement or the right to a name.  
 
2.7 Function of jus cogens  
The function of jus cogens norms in the field of law of treaties is founded in article 
53 of the Vienna Convention.  This article provides that ‘a treaty is void if, at the 
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time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm of general international 
law’.  
 
2.7.1 Invalidation of treaty 
The specific function of jus cogens norms in the law of treaties ‘is to prevent 
violations of the substantive provisions of norms having a peremptory character’,87 
by invaliding any treaty inconsistent with it. In others words, jus cogens norms in the 
law of treaties has the ability to prevent and to invalidate any conduct contrary to 
substantive provisions. Thus where peremptory norms of general international law 
are violated, the treaty conflicting with it is void and incapable of creating any legal 
effects.  
 
However, certain commentators express the view that a ‘peremptory norm does not 
function only with respect to treaties’,88 but it also concerns unilateral acts of states. 
In fact, this view signifies that jus cogens have the power to bar or invalidate any act 
of state which is inconsistent with a peremptory norm of general international law.  
 
As I will discuss later, this opinion emerged from the International Criminal Tribunal 
for Yugoslavia (ICTY) in the Furundzija case. The court held that ‘the fact that 
torture is prohibited by a peremptory norm of international law has effects at the 
inter-state and individual levels.89 At the inter-state level, it serves to internationally 
delegitimise any legislative, administrative or judicial act authorizing torture’.90 My 
view is that where a peremptory norm is universally accepted and recognized; states 
may not invoke their internal affairs or territorial sovereignty to avoid its binding 
effects. 
 
2.7.2 Limitation of the will of states 
Traditional international law was governed by the principle of freedom of states to 
consent to any particular treaty.  States were free to contract out of general rules of 
law through other valid or binding arrangements. The introduction of jus cogens to 
the law of treaties precipitated significant changes in the way states contract. In the 
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first place, the consent of states was limited, especially in the field of peremptory 
norms of general international law. In other words, members of the international 
community are proscribed from using their sovereignty to sidestep recognized 
peremptory norms. It appears that the major change that jus cogens introduced to the 
field of law of treaties is the limitation of states’ will. 
 
In the case concerning the imposition of the death penalty on juveniles in the United 
States, the Inter-American Commission held that the prohibition of juveniles’ 
execution had attained the status of a jus cogens norm, and that this status was 
recognized by all states in the inter-American system, including the United States.91 
Despite the fact that United States did not expressly recognize this rule, the 
Commission condemned the United States because the peremptory norm proscribing 
the use of the death penalty compelled the United States to contract out of it.  
 
Thus the notion of peremptory norms in international law encompasses the limitation 
of states sovereignty. Here, it is important to mention that within traditional 
international law, the effects of treaty law bound only states parties to it, through the 
principle of pacta sunt servanda. In the case of jus cogens norms, a peremptory norm 
of general international law binds all members of the international community: It 
does not differentiate between those who consent or not to the convention. 
 
2.7.3 Hierarchy of norms rather than sources 
The third effect of jus cogens norms is the recognition of the existence of superior 
norms over ordinary norms in international law. Thus the acceptance by the 
international community of the existence of a normative hierarchy theory in the 
international order is significant. International law was characterized by a hierarchy 
of sources rather than norms. Thus the recognition of a priority of certain norms over 
others is a revolution from ‘the traditional principle of mutual flexibility between the 
sources, whereby treaty and customary law could derogate from one another’.92 Jus 
cogens norms have introduced an important change in the law of treaties, by 
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‘postulating a hierarchy of rules, rather than sources, on the basis of their content and 
underlying values’.93  
 
This raises questions on how to resolve conflicts between jus cogens stemming from 
two different sources. If two parties found their arguments on two conflicting 
peremptory norms of different sources, which one prevail? For instance, how to 
resolve the conflict between jus cogens stemming from customary law and another 
drawn from conventional law.    
 
Therefore the postulate that ‘a norm which can be modified only by a subsequent 
norm of general international law is having the same character,94entails that 
peremptory norm modify each other. The Vienna Convention is silent on the 
superiority of sources of jus cogens. This is important because in traditional 
international law, article 38(1) of the ICJ Statute recognizes the graduation of sources 
of international law. Article 38(1) requires the Court to apply, among other things, 
(a) international conventions expressly recognized by the contesting states, and (b) 
international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law.  
 
To avoid the possibility of non liquet, sub-paragraph (c) added the requirement that 
the general principles applied by the Court must be ‘general principles of the law 
recognized by civilized nations’. sub-paragraph (d) acknowledges that the Court is 
entitled to refer to ‘judicial decisions’ and to the most highly qualified juristic 
writings ‘as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law’. It seems that the 
peremptory norms theory does not recognize such a graduation of sources. 
Nevertheless, in practice this conflict often appears, as we will see in the chapter 
concerning the implementation of jus cogens norms.  
 
2.7.4 The establishment of objective illegality in international law 
The third significant change brought by the introduction of jus cogens norms is ‘the 
notion of objective illegality’95 in international law. The term ‘objective illegality’ 
means that the international community agrees to invalidate any treaty or act contrary 
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to peremptory norms. This engenders the view that the international community may 
invalidate any act of sovereign states which conflicts with jus cogens. Thus illegality 
objective prevents states from invoking their sovereignty to justify violation of 
peremptory norms.   
 
Although the concept of peremptory norms owes its existence to the Vienna 
Convention, legal history demonstrates that this concept has been in use for 
centuries. 
 
2.8 Concluding remarks 
Jus cogens norms may be defined as no-derogable rights of general international law.  
These norms originate from natural law and as such supersede other norms. It has 
been held that the principal function of peremptory norms is to establish a hierarchy 
of norms and limit the will of states upon certain rules regarded as non derogable by 
the international community. Those norms may stem from general convention, 
general customary law or general principles of international law. The focal point of a 
peremptory norm is that the norm must be generally accepted and recognized by the 
international community as a norm from which no derogation is permitted. The 
difference between peremptory norms and other norms of general international law is 
that peremptory norms bind members of the international law without their consent. 
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Chapter III: The international practice and issues raised by the implementation 
of peremptory human rights norms 
 
3.1. Introduction 
While the concept of peremptory norms in human rights is increasingly accepted, 
there still remain certain unresolved issues surrounding the application of jus cogens.  
This chapter will discuss certain, if not all, issues raised by the application of jus 
cogens in the field of human rights. It will first examine the principle of state 
immunity as an exception to binding norms of jus cogens. This first section will ask 
the question whether state immunity can be used to avoid the binding force of 
peremptory norms. The chapter will also discuss how peremptory human rights 
norms influence national law. After this it will examine the argument that the 
concept of jus cogens violates the traditional principles of indivisibility and 
interdependence of human rights. In other words, how can one rank human rights, 
while in principle all human rights are equal. Lastly, this chapter will discuss 
difficulties of implementing jus cogens. 
 
3.2. State immunity and jus cogens 
International practice demonstrates that state immunity is frequently invoked to 
escape liability for violations of peremptory human rights. This section will critically 
analyze the arguments preferred by supporters of the state immunity principle.  
 
State immunity is an exception from which exonerates states from civil and criminal 
liability or the administrative jurisdiction of another state, by reasons of international 
legal norms, stemming from custom, practice, doctrine, jurisprudence and treaty. 
Traditionally, state immunity is regarded as a rule that a domestic court will not 
vindicate a foreign state without its consent.96 This principle is founded in the maxim 
in parem non habet imperium, ‘an equal has no power over an equal’.97 Thus the 
sovereign equality of states is the focal point of the doctrine of state immunity.  
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However, the increasing participation of states in the private sectors ousted the 
possibility of considering state immunity without promoting injustice owing to 
contractual relationship between states and individuals or private entities. The reason 
is that states continued to invoke immunity in legal proceedings arising from their 
private activities. 
 
As a result, the doctrine of relative state immunity98 was born, which was restricted 
to actions relating to sovereign or public acts (jus imperii), and excluded civil actions 
concerning private or commercial acts (jus gestionis). As from the introduction of 
relative state immunity, states were prevented from invoking immunity to bar civil 
actions related to their private activities.  
 
In 1991, the International Law Commission’s Draft Articles on Jurisdictional 
Immunities of States and Their Property codified this change.99  Article 5 of the draft 
provides that ‘a State enjoys immunity, in respect of itself and its property, from the 
jurisdiction of the courts of another State subject to the provisions of the present 
articles’. Articles 10 to 17, then provide for ‘proceedings in which State immunity 
cannot be invoked’, establishing exceptions that confirm the relative state immunity 
theory.  
 
One of the striking exceptions to state immunity which is also related to this study is 
that a foreign state may not invoke immunity from jurisdiction before local courts for 
lawsuits in which it is alleged to have committed a tort.100 It is common cause that 
the granting of jurisdictional immunity to states which have allegedly violated 
fundamental human rights is no longer accepted in international law, due to the 
special characteristics of such rights.101 There are ‘intangible’ rights from which 
states may not derogate under any circumstances.102  These rights are peremptory or 
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jus cogens norms. All members of the international community may legitimately 
demand their observance and reparation for any violation thereof. It follows that 
nowadays, states may not use their immunity as a defence to violations of jus cogens 
norms. 
 
In Pinochet, the House of Lords had to decide whether to recognise criminal 
jurisdictional immunity for the former President of Chile, General Augusto Pinochet 
Ugarte. 103 Pinochet was in the UK when the request for his extradition was issued by 
a judge in Spain, where he was facing prosecution for a series of criminal offences 
that constituted violations of human rights, committed during the time he governed 
Chile. The Lords decided, in their judgment of 24 March 1999,104 that the 
international legal system could not confer immunity ratione materiae on heads of 
state regarding criminal jurisdiction for official acts of torture,105 since it is precisely 
these acts that it intends to criminalize as violations of fundamental norms of the 
international community.106 It has been argued that Pinochet ‘has emphasized the 
limits of immunity in respect of gross human rights violations by State officials’.107  
There can be no doubt that this case, and the widespread publicity it received, has 
generated support for the view that state officials should not be entitled to plead 
immunity for acts of torture committed in their own territories in both civil and 
criminal actions.108 Quoting the Furundzija case, the court held that: 
 
 “Because of the importance of the values it protects, [the prohibition of 
torture] has evolved into a peremptory norm or jus cogens, that is, a norm that 
enjoys a higher rank in the international hierarchy than treaty law and even 
'ordinary' customary rules. The most conspicuous consequence of this higher 
rank is that the principle at issue cannot be derogated from by states through 
international treaties or local or special customs or even general customary 
                                               
103
 The Pinochet case (footnote 6). 
104
 Ibid. 
105
 The difference between ratione personae immunity and ratione materiae immunity is also present 
in diplomatic immunities, as can be seen in the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, opened 
for signature 18 April 1961, 500 UNTS 95, art 39(2) (entered into force 24 April 1964): 
106
 For further details on Pinochet see Handl ‘The Pinochet Case, Foreign State Immunity and the 
Changing  Constitution of the International Community’ in Benedek, Isak and Renate Kicker 
(eds)Development and Developing International and European Law: Essays in Honour of Konrad 
Ginther on the Occasion of His 65th Birthday (1999) 79. 
107
 International Law Commission Report of the Working Group, VII, Supp 10, Appendix, [11]. 
108
 Ibid. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
 26
rules not endowed with the same normative force. . . . Clearly, the jus cogens 
nature of the prohibition against torture articulates the notion that the 
prohibition has now become one of the most fundamental standards of the 
international community. Furthermore, this prohibition is designed to produce 
a deterrent effect, in that it signals to all members of the international 
community and the individuals over whom they wield authority that the 
prohibition of torture is an absolute value from which nobody must 
deviate.”109 
 
The jus cogens nature of the prohibition against torture grants states the universal 
jurisdiction punish the crime wherever it has been committed.  As common enemies 
of international community, the offenders of jus cogens norms may be punished by 
any state because all nations have an equal interest in their apprehension and 
prosecution.110 The Pinochet and Furundzija cases illustrated the new trend where 
states may not use state immunity as a defence with respect to jus cogens norms 
violations. 
 
In AL-Adsani case, the European Court of Hunan Rights refused to follow the 
foundations laid down by Pinochet case with regards to the authority of jus cogens 
norms over ordinary norms of international law. In the court’s view the right of 
access to court is not absolute, but ‘may be subject to limitations’.111 It held that any 
such limitation must only be imposed on the grounds that it ‘pursues a legitimate aim 
and there is proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be 
achieved’.112 Furthermore, it is understood that the granting of jurisdictional 
immunity to Kuwait by the British courts in civil proceedings resulting from an act 
of torture pursued a legitimate aim, based on the international law rule par in parem 
non habet imperium.113 
 
On the merits, although, the court recognized the prohibition of torture as a 
peremptory norm, it rejected the argument that the breach of such a norm prevails 
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over denial of state immunity in civil suits.114 In the court’s view, the acceptance of 
the hierarchy of a peremptory norm upon state immunity will entail a wide range of 
matters;115 consequently will alter the relationships between states. Thus there is no 
evidence that the denial of immunity of a perpetrator state causes serious damage 
between states. Even so, can one support the impunity of violations of peremptory 
norm of general international law in the light of preservation of bilateral or multi-
lateral relations between states? Clearly the denial of immunity would ‘have a 
preventive impact deterring the governments with assets abroad from torturing 
individuals’.116  
 
It is worth noting that Al-Adsani could only get any remedy from the Kuwait through 
the English court. The ECHR by rejecting the applicant’s claim on the ground of 
state immunity demonstrated that the fate of Al-Adsani depended on his perpetrator. 
In Al-Adsani case, the Court established the existence of violation of peremptory 
norm, but had failed to try the perpetrator because of its immunity. 
The dissenting judges rejected the view that state immunity is a bar to prosecution, 
and held that the jus cogens norm prohibiting of torture prevailed over state 
immunity.117 Consequently Kuwait could not hide on hierarchically lower rules to 
avoid the consequences of its actions. One notices that the dissenting judgment was 
based on the theory of limitation of state immunity according to which a foreign state 
may not invoke immunity from jurisdiction before local courts for lawsuits in which 
it is alleged to have committed a tort.118 This theory means that state immunity can 
be pleaded for lawful acts of states complying with international law; any act of state 
which contravenes international law is not covered by state immunity. 
 
This paper argues that the ECHR erred, in Al-Adsani, by taking the view that in terms 
of criminal proceedings, peremptory norm can have procedural effect, but not in civil 
proceedings. In this case the court did not demonstrate why the norm that can prevail 
over procedural norms in one field cannot achieve the same result in other fields. The 
majority did not consider that the nature of proceedings does not determine the 
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effects of jus cogens but its character as peremptory norms upon lower rules. As 
observed in the dissenting opinion that ‘projecting such distinction between criminal 
and civil proceedings is not consonant with the very essence of the operation of the 
jus cogens rules’.119 The joint dissenting opinion observed that: 
 
It is not the nature of the proceedings which determines the effects that a jus 
cogens rule has upon another rule of international law, but the character of 
the rule as a peremptory norm and its interaction with a hierarchically lower 
rule. The prohibition of torture being a rule of jus cogens, acts in the 
international sphere and deprives the rule of sovereign immunity of all its 
legal effects in that sphere. The criminal or civil nature of domestic 
proceedings is immaterial. The jurisdictional bar is lifted by very interaction 
if the international rules involved, and the national judge cannot admit a plea 
of immunity.120 
 
This reasoning has been supported in certain national courts. Greek and Italian courts 
have recognized the primacy of jus cogens over immunities.121 In the Voiotia case122 
which concerned the reparation of atrocities, including murder and destruction of 
private property committed by German occupation forces in the village of Distomo 
during the Second World War, the Hellenic Supreme Court decided that when a state 
breaches jus cogens norms waives its entitlement to sovereign immunity for those 
breaches.123 
 
The Ferrini case124concerned the reparations for the atrocities committed by German 
occupation forces in Italy in World War II. The appeal court in Florence, upheld the 
judgment of court of the first instance. However the Italian Supreme Court held that 
a foreign state cannot enjoy immunity for sovereign acts which can be classified as 
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international crimes of the same time.125 Furthermore, the Court considered the 
denial of immunity as compliance with the provisions of ILC’s article 4 not 
recognizes breaches of peremptory norms and not to assist the state that has 
committed such a breach.126 
 
Here, both courts examined the effects of a jus cogens norms on lower norms. It can 
be said that supporting immunity in the case of a breach of a peremptory norm would 
certainly mean supporting such a breach and assisting the wrongdoer state in 
consolidating that outcome.127 For this reason, both Courts, given the prevalence of 
peremptory norms were obliged to deny immunity. 
 
Furthermore, in Al-Adsani case, the Court did not address the issue of peremptory 
norms; all it did was to draw a distinction between substantive peremptory rules and 
the procedural rule of immunity.  
 
It is the writer’s view that the existence in international law of peremptory norms 
would not make sense, if some procedural rules such as state immunity can prevent 
the enforcement of these norms. A procedural rule may prevail over peremptory 
norm only if it protects an interest having equal or the same status with such a 
peremptory norm.  Here it must be noted that state immunity has inferior status vis-à-
vis peremptory norms. Therefore, if a court holds that it cannot enforce the violation 
of a jus cogens norm because of lower a rule of state immunity, it effectively holds 
that peremptory norms do not exist in international sphere. 
 
Secondly, jus cogens, contrary to certain doctrinal arguments, are not limited to the 
substantive rule, but also aim to have an impact on the legal consequences of the 
breach of the relevant substantive peremptory norm.128 Thus, article 53 and 71 of the 
Vienna Convention are not about the substantive requirements not to breach 
peremptory norms, but about the peremptory consequences applicable to the breach 
that has already happened.129 
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Finally, acts such as torture, crimes against humanity or war crimes cannot be 
protected by state immunity. Originally, state immunity was established to protect 
legitimate and legal acts of foreign states and did not cover illegal acts of foreign 
state thus escaping prosecution in foreign forums. 
 
3.3. Peremptory norms in domestic law. 
The concept of jus cogens has also been questioned in relation to those who believe 
that it limits the legislative process of states. According to its opponents, jus cogens 
should bind only parties to treaties but not acts of legislative, executive and judiciary.  
Their objection is based on the fact that peremptory norms should not prevent the 
functioning of national law. This section will explain how peremptory norms 
constrain national legal systems and whether this intervention or extension of jus 
cogens in national law complies with the spirit of the Vienna Convention. It will also 
examine whether such an extension of the legal effect of jus cogens has negative 
effects in the enforcement of human rights in national spheres.  
 
Traditionally, the provisions of the Vienna Convention limited the application of 
peremptory norms to unlawful international agreements. In compliance with article 
53, a treaty is null and void if it is inconsistent with a peremptory nom of general 
international law. And article 71 of the Vienna Convention states that states parties 
have to avoid entering into which conflict with peremptory norms, and should bring 
their agreements into conformity with peremptory norms.  
 
However, international practice demonstrates that the application of jus cogens 
should not be limited only to international agreements but must extend to unilateral 
acts of member states. In Furundzija case130, the ICTY decided that a peremptory 
norm of international law not only affects international agreements but also 
individual’ acts of states. Given the fact that torture is a peremptory norm of 
international law, the ICTY held that: 
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The fact that torture is prohibited by a peremptory norm of international law 
has effects at the inter-State and individual levels.  At the inter-State level, it 
serves to internationally deligitimise any legislative, administrative or judicial 
act authorizing torture.  It would be senseless to argue, on the one hand that 
on account of the jus cogens value of the prohibition against torture, treaties 
or customary rules providing for torture would be null and void ab initio, and 
then be unmindful of a state say, taking national measures authorizing or 
condoning torture or absolving its perpetrator through an amnesty 
law…Furthermore, at the individual level, that is, that of criminal liability, it 
would seem that one of the consequences of the jus cogens character 
bestowed by the international community upon the prohibition of torture is 
that every state is entitled to investigate, prosecute and punish or extradite 
individuals accused of torture, who are present in a territory under its 
jurisdiction.131 
 
 From Furundzija two methods of how peremptory norms may intervene in national 
law are discernible. Firstly, peremptory norms ‘serve to internationally deligitimise 
any legislative, administrative or judicial act’,132 authorizing violation of jus cogens. 
In other words, any unilateral act of state whether legislative, administrative or 
judicial would be null or void if it does not comply with peremptory norms of 
international law. This can be referred as active obligation of state not to act contrary 
to a peremptory norm. The reasoning in Furundzija has been supported by certain 
international courts as well as in national system such as in Switzerland’s referendum 
and the ECHR in the Soering v the United Kingdom.  
 
The invalidation of people’s initiative in Swiss 133(Swiss referendum) is an 
interesting example where the application of jus cogens limits national law. In July 
1992, the people’s initiative had submitted to the federal Government of Swizerland 
a referendum in which they proposed that a constitutional clause determined that 
asylum seekers who enter the country illegally would be deported summarily and 
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without giving him or her chance to appeal.134  In 1994, the Federal Government 
(federal Council) of Swiss informed the people that the refugee right to non-
refoulement had reached the status of jus cogens norm.135 Consequently, states are 
under obligation to refrain from extraditing persons to a country where they may face 
cruel and degrading treatment. This entails that states have obligations to investigate 
whether the deportation of a particular asylum seeker will have such effect.136 While 
the constitutional amendment proposed by the people’s initiative did not provide for 
such an investigation, such asylum seekers could be deported summarily. Thus, any 
person who fled his or her country for reasons of persecution would face refoulement 
to the state where he or she will be subject to cruel, inhumane and degrading 
treatment. This would have constituted a breach of the peremptory norm of non-
refoulemt which is incorporated in the Swiss constitution. 
 
Additionally peremptory norms also influence national law especially criminal 
Court. This is in criminal liability. Thus when a peremptory norm has been violated 
‘every state is entitled to investigate, prosecute and punish or extradite individuals 
who are present in a territory under its jurisdiction’.137 In this way, jus cogens 
introduce a passive obligation upon states. Consequently, states may not justify their 
passivity on the ground that they have not incorporated such infraction in their legal 
systems. 
 
However, the decision in Furundzija does not limit the scope of article 53 only to 
treaties; it also concerns ‘the execution of certain obligations under treaty’.138 Thus 
for instance, a state may not extradite a person to a country where he may face a 
violation of his peremptory rights. The decision in Soering v the United Kingdom139 
may be a relevant example in this matter. The treaty of extradition between USA and 
UK did not violate the peremptory nom, but the execution of such treaty would have 
had such effect. This case involved the extradition of a German national to Virginia 
in the USA where he faced the death penalty.140 The ECHR held that transferring 
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Soering to a territory where he risked experiencing cruel and inhuman treatment was 
clearly in violation of article 3141, hence contrary to the spirit and intention of that 
article. In this case the treaty of extradition between the USA and UK remains intact 
and valid, but the execution of obligations of such treaty would violate peremptory 
norms. 
 
The first justification for the extension of peremptory norms to unilateral acts of 
states is that imperative norms that are capable of nullifying treaties may also nullify 
national law. As said in Soering, violation of peremptory norm may occur by treaty 
as well as by a unilateral act of a state. Some commentators consider this approach as 
an extension of the role and purpose of the notion of jus cogens. This paper submits 
that such an approach is not pervasive, in the sense that a peremptory norm concerns 
the international community as whole, and it will be senseless to limit its scope only 
to treaties and leave the unilateral acts of state without regulation. It would be 
inconceivable that ‘these effects should not extend to any act or action having the 
character of the lower rank than rules’.142 Therefore, the rejection of the extension of 
the scope of jus cogens to unilateral acts of states is not justifiable.  
 
3.4. Jus cogens and the principles of human rights 
The question of the incompatibility of jus cogens with the indivisibility and 
interdependence of human rights143 is often raised by certain human rights scholars. 
They contend that the interdependence and indivisibility of human rights makes the 
notion of hierarchy more contentious. The main question in this section is whether 
there is any hierarchy among human rights norms. Firstly, this section will define the 
concepts of indivisibility and interdependence and their recognition in international 
law. Secondly it will discuss the subdivision of human rights into generations, a sort 
of hierarchy. Lastly it will examine the core rights which are regarded as being 
superior human rights. 
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The indivisibility of human rights means that none of the rights that are considered to 
be more important than any of the others; all rights are inter-related.144 In other 
words, the indivisibility of human rights debunks the notion that ‘specific human 
rights’ can have hierarchical status placing some rights above others. In this 
connection, the indivisibility and interdependence concepts appear to be 
incompatible with the notion of hierarchy. 
 
International instruments recognize the indivisibility of human rights in their 
provisions. For example, the General Assembly of the UN recognizes that human 
rights are ‘interdependent and indivisible’.145 The First World Conference on Human 
Rights in Teheran (1968) proclaimed that ‘human rights and fundamental freedoms 
are indivisible.’ It is common cause that the realisation of each human right requires 
other human rights and, in this sense, all human rights are indivisible. This notion has 
been strengthened, by article 6 of the Declaration on the Right to Development 
(1986) and paragraph 5 of the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action (1993) 
adopted at the second World Conference on Human rights.  
 
Despite the recognition of the principle of indivisibility, there is no agreement among 
nations and cultures as to the universality of human rights. Cultural diversity entails 
different views about what deserve to be recognized as human rights norms. Thus, 
what is wrong in one culture may not necessarily be wrong in another.  
 
It is also important to observe that international instruments recognizing the 
indivisibility principle are soft law. Hence the indivisibility principle is ineffective in 
international law. 
 
 While peremptory norms of human rights are the concerns of the international 
community as a whole, no state may violate peremptory human rights on the basis of 
its cultures.  Thus, the introduction of jus cogens in human rights will foster 
universal acceptance of human rights as core rights. This means that peremptory 
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norms help to resolve the conflict between relativism and universalism application of 
human rights. 
The classification of human rights norms in three generations introduces also a sort 
of hierarchy in the field of human rights. Thus it has become a habit to divide human 
rights in three generations. According to the current terminology, human rights of the 
first generation are ‘negative’ human rights, or civil liberties, which enjoin states to 
abstain from interfering with personal freedoms.146 For instance, freedom and 
security of person or freedom of speech belong to the first generation147 which are 
fundamentally civil and political in nature, and serve to protect the individual from 
the excesses of the state.  
Second-generation rights are related to equality and began to be recognized by 
governments after World War I.  They are fundamentally social, economic, and 
cultural in nature. They ensure different members of the citizenry enjoy equal 
conditions and treatment. Secondary rights would include a right to be employed; 
rights to housing and health care as well as social security and unemployment 
benefits. Like first-generation rights, they were also covered by the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). 
Third-generation rights go beyond the mere civil and social, as expressed in many 
progressive documents of international law including the 1972 Stockholm 
Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, the 1992 
Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, and other pieces of generally 
aspirational  “soft law”. Because of the principle of sovereignty and the intransigence 
of would-be offender nations, these rights have been hard to impliment in legally 
binding documents. The following rights are third generation rights: 
• Group and collective rights              
• Right to   self-determination                                   
• Right to economic and social development                                       
• Right to a healthy environment                         
• Right to natural resources   
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• Right to communicate and communication rights           
• Right to participation cultural heritage       
Thus it is important to note that the rights of the first two generations are included in 
international treaties. The third generation rights have been affirmed by the 
resolution of UN General Assembly and are included in African Charter on Human 
and People’s Rights.148 This distinction would appear to entail a hierarchy of human 
rights. Thus, the violations of the right to life, freedom from torture and violations 
constituting crimes of Genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes tend to 
attract the sharpest scrutiny149. While economic, social and cultural rights and some 
‘third generation’ rights, such as the right to development, have received increased 
consideration within the human rights body and remain a priority among some 
developing countries, efforts aimed towards implementation of these rights remain 
slow-moving.150 
As argued previously, all peremptory norms are considered to be at the same level. 
Even if it stems from the first or third generation; the right stated differently is going 
to have the same status as other rights. In other terms, while traditional human rights 
acknowledge a hierarchy of generations, peremptory human rights norms do not 
permit such a status. Thus, jus cogens norms not only entail universal acceptance 
among human rights, but also prevent the creation of hierarchy of generations among 
them, as all peremptory norms are equal. 
As mentioned above, there is a common understanding that human rights are 
independent, indivisible and interrelated. The effective realization of human rights 
requires that all rights should be protected in the same way. However, in times of 
emergency most rights can be suspended, and only non-derogable rights remain 
operational. Thus, the International Covenant on Civil and Political rights 
151(ICCPR), European Convention for Protection of Human rights and Fundamental 
freedoms152, and the American Convention on Human rights153 each contain 
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provisions allowing states parties to derogate from specified rights during declared 
states of emergency. At the same time, these instruments provide that select groups 
of enumerated rights may never be suspended or limited, even during national 
emergencies. As such the right to life, freedom from slavery or servitude, freedom 
from torture, cruel and inhuman treatment or punishment and the non-retroactive 
application of criminal laws are considered as ‘non-derogable’ or ‘core rights’.  
 
This raises questions on whether indivisibility of human rights means that particular 
certain rights may be noted as non-derogable rights while others are considered as 
derogable. Furthermore, the difference between derogable and non-derogable rights 
creates a hierarchy among human rights? The response is affirmative, because non-
derogable rights are considered as ‘superior’ to derogable rights. All peremptory 
human rights are considered as non-derogable. To conclude, the theory of normative 
hierarchy exists within traditional human rights law. Thus, one cannot support the 
view that jus cogens would appear to be incompatible with the notion of indivisibility 
and interdependence of human rights. 
 
3.6. Conclusion 
There is a trend of christening most human rights as jus cogens. Despite such a trend, 
there are certain issues surrounding the application of the peremptory theory in the 
realm of human rights. It is argued that state immunity is often invoked by states to 
avoid any liability stemming from the violations of peremptory norms. And, in most 
cases, courts grant immunity to such states. This chapter has argued that the reasons 
advanced for granting immunity are often unfounded. The hierarchy theory is also 
considered as incompatible with the indivisibility and interdependence principles of 
human rights. This chapter argues that the hierarchy theory cannot be considered as 
conflicting with human rights, because the hierarchy theory exists within human 
rights norms. Nevertheless, the absence of a precise definition, coupled with the 
absence of a precise list of peremptory norms, and the tendency of christening rules 
as peremptory, undermine the effectiveness of jus cogens. 
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Chapter IV: Jus cogens, normative hierarchy theory and Human rights 
 
1. Introduction 
As demonstrated in the preceding chapters, jus cogens norms introduce a hierarchy 
among rules rather than sources. This chapter will first discuss the theory of 
hierarchy. It will then examine the definition of the hierarchy theory and its 
relevance in international law. This chapter will also discuss the use of the normative 
theory in human rights law. In addition, it will focus on how jus cogens norms 
contribute to the effectiveness of human rights. In other words, how jus cogens 
norms influence human rights. Furthermore, this section of the thesis will 
contextualize the universal acceptance of human rights, the superiority of human 
rights and non-derogability of from human rights norms. Finally, the chapter will 
examine the rules of human rights which can be classified as jus cogens norms. 
  
2. Jus cogens and the hierarchy theory 
2.1 The definition of hierarchy  
The term ‘hierarchy’ can be defined as ‘any system of persons or things ranked one 
above the other’.154 It can also be defined as a system of levels according to which 
persons or things are organized. The theory of hierarchy may be defined as a theory 
according to which people or things are levelly organized.  
 
In law, a hierarchy concerns the coherence of orderly organized norms.  The theory 
also pre-supposes the existence of superior and inferior sources of norms. Slim 
Laghmani defines the hierarchy theory as ‘the most important mechanism to avoid 
conflicts of norms’.155 Consequently, the hierarchy theory plays the role of placing 
norms in order with a view to preventing any subsequent conflicts between legal 
norms. In this sense, legal hierarchy entails ‘a particular distribution of power’156 
among legal norms. 
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But since the adoption of the Vienna Convention, there is a trend towards defining 
hierarchy not from sources of norms but from the content or values of the norms.  
Lach, for instance, argues that ‘hierarchy determined by the content of the norm is 
acquiring greater significance’.157 This value-oriented element of hierarchy is 
embeded in article 53 of the Vienna convention. This article refers to the 
international community as a whole and the Barcelona Traction case by using the 
words, ‘the importance of the rights involved’.158 It seems that, nowadays, when one 
talks about a hierarchy of norms, one refers to a value–oriented element rather than 
sources of norms. Weil and Paulus recognized that a hierarchy of norms is shifted to 
a normative content of rules.159  Thus the hierarchy of norms concept raises questions 
about: which rules ‘trump’ others and what values are more important. Therefore, a 
hierarchy of norms may be defined as a theory concerning the ordering of norms 
based on their values or content. 
 
2.2 The effects of the hierarchy theory in the legal system 
The effect of the hierarchy theory in any legal system is to establish cohesion in 
order to avoid any subsequent conflict of norms.160 In fact, the effectiveness of any 
legal system depends on its coherence. Thus, any legal order is characterized by 
‘general and individual rules and by the existence of ordering character’.161 It is 
important to note that this graduation is a necessary feature of any legal system 
which makes norms interpretation and application possible. 
 
Thus, in the case of a conflict between two norms, the superior norms in terms of 
hierarchy will apply.  The Pinochet case, for instance, seems to illustrate the 
hierarchy theory. In this case, the British law lords held that article 4(1) of the 
Convention Against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment162 provided that jurisdiction of the British House of Lords was available 
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even in cases concerning heads of state, for any act of torture. The attempts to 
balance the competing interests of immunity of head of state and peremptory norms 
lead to the prevalence of the latter.  Hierarchy theory provides the cohesion within a 
legal system, in order to avoid ineffectiveness of norms. It is fair to say that the 
absence of a hierarchy of norms may lead to anarchy.  
 
It is important to note that there are three features of hierarchy: The first character is 
that hierarchy entails the idea of value. A norm acquires a priority upon others 
because of its value. As previously mentioned, the Barcelona Traction Case when 
addressing the notion of erga omnes uses the phrase the importance of rights 
involved. The second feature of hierarchy is the function of norms. Compelling 
norms, for instance make the difference between ‘derogable rights and non-derogable 
rights’.163 In this sense, one can argue that hierarchical norms appear as ‘result of 
accommodating competing values’.164 The last character of hierarchy is that a 
superior norm is the result of community interests. Thus high-ranking norms 
represent the interests of an international community as whole.165 These three 
elements once completed entail the elevation of norm in high-ranking status. 
 
2.3. International law and the hierarchy of sources 
Based on the hierarchy theory, this section tries to answer the question: what happens 
in international law if a rule that is derived from one source of international law 
conflicts with a rule derived from another source?   
 
Article 38(1)166of Status of the ICJ is generally recognised as a definitive statement 
of the sources of international law. It requires the ICJ to apply, among other things, 
(a) international conventions ‘expressly recognized by the contesting states’, and (b) 
‘international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law’. To avoid 
the possibility of non liquet, sub-paragraph (c) added the requirement that the general 
principles applied by the Court were those that were ‘the general principles of the 
law recognized by civilized nations’. As it is, states that by consent determine the 
content of international ‘law, sub-paragraph (d) acknowledges that the Court is 
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entitled to refer to; judicial decisions’ and the most highly qualified juristic writings 
‘as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law’. 
On the question of preference between sources of international law, rules established 
by treaty will take preference if such an instrument exists167. It is also argued 
however that international treaties and international customs are sources of 
international law of equal validity; this is that ‘new custom may supersede older 
treaties and new treaties may override older customs’.168 It appears that since the 
main function of the general principles of law is to ‘fill the gap of treaty law and 
customary law’,169 it would appear that treaties and customary rules prevail over 
general principles of law.  
Nevertheless, apart from article 38 of Statute of the ICJ, which introduces hierarchy 
of norms, article 103 of Charter of United Nations provides that ‘in the event of a 
conflict between the obligations of member states under the Charter and their 
obligations under any other international agreement, their obligations under the 
Charter shall prevail,’ carries the hierarchical principle of general international law. 
This article establishes the supremacy of UN Charter over other international treaties. 
 
In the sphere of international law, there are also certain international instruments that 
recognize hierarchical principles. The European system, for instance, recognizes the 
treaty establishing the European Community (treaty of Rome) as supreme law.170 In 
the United Nations, Staff Rules promulgated by Secretary General are subordinated 
to resolutions of General Assembly and the latter are subordinated to the Charter.171  
It is also possible, though less common, for a treaty to be modified by practices 
arising between the parties to that treaty. The other situation in which a rule would 
take precedence over a treaty provision would be where the rule has the special status 
of being part of the jus cogens. In such a manner that hierarchy is focused on values 
of norms rather than sources of norms. As previously seen, such a hierarchy theory 
has been introduced in international law by the Vienna Convention of the Law of 
                                               
167
 Akehurst A Modern Introduction to International Law 6th Ed  pp 40 (1987). 
168
 Ibid. 
169
 Ibid. 
170
 The Treaty of Rome Establishing the European Economic Community, March 19957. 
171
 Ibid. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
p
 To
wn
 42
Treaties. And the introduction of jus cogens norms changes the foundation of 
international law which was based on the consent of its subject’s members. Under 
article 53 of the Vienna Convention member states are not free to contract out of the 
peremptory norms of general international law.      
2.4. Human rights law and that hierarchy of norms 
The hierarchy of human rights norms is influenced by the three features seen above. 
The first feature influencing the hierarchy of human rights is that human rights are 
used as direct expression of individual welfare. There is a hierarchy in human rights 
because ‘any international value is supposed to be attributed to an individual’,172 
because a legal fictitious entity, especially such as the state, does not have a real 
existence. That is why scholars and international lawyers consider human rights 
norms to be high priority. Thus, in the Barcelona Traction case, the ICJ, by defining 
what the obligation erga omnes might contain, held that ‘such an obligation derives, 
for example, in contemporary international law, from outlawing acts of aggression, 
and of genocide, as also from the principles and rules concerning the basic rights of 
the human person, including protection from slavery and racial discrimination’.173  
One can get an impression from the decision of the Court, that jus cogens norms are 
only constituted by human rights norms. Furthermore, one can notice that among 
human rights norms, non-derogable rights signify ‘a more fundamental interest 
which often differs from other human rights norms’.174 The superiority of non-
derogable human rights is based on value-oriented identification. It is safe to 
conclude that the hierarchy theory among human rights norms is influenced by the 
value of the norm. Therefore, the value of a norm is the most important character of 
its hierarchy.  
The second character that has an impact in the hierarchy of human rights is the 
function of norms. The good understanding of this feature is the example jus cogens 
norms, as seen in the definition, function in “the realm of validity”.175. In other 
words, peremptory norms or no-derogable norms deserve certain consideration in 
order to operate effectively. It is the case, for instance, of non-derogable rights in 
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emergency situatiions. They remain non-derogable. This is what leads one to 
conclude that hierarchical norms appear as a ‘result of competing values’.   
This character often links human rights and jus cogens, in the sense that among 
community interests, human rights rules are based on the interests of individuals’176. 
The collective interest of the international community is an important character of jus 
cogens norms. In early 1957, Fitzmaurice, one of the rapporteurs of the ILC, argued 
that jus cogens establishes an important obligation because ‘all rules of this particular 
character are intended not so much for the benefit of the states, as directly for the 
benefit of the individuals concerned, as human beings and humanitarian grounds’.177 
This is why certain commentators178 hold that all human rights norms are jus cogens. 
Nevertheless, it is safe to argue that human rights norms play a significant role in the 
development of jus cogens, and the latter influence human rights norms. The next 
section examines how jus cogens norms affects human rights. 
3. The scope of jus cogens in human rights 
The trend of using jus cogens in the field of human rights becomes increasingly 
frequent. One can argue that there is ‘an intrinsic relationship between jus cogens 
and human rights’.179 But the one who has a good understanding of the function of 
jus cogens, will argue that because jus cogens gives priority to human rights rules 
upon other rules. Thus the priority of norms leads to its validity over others. This 
leads to the claim that the application of peremptory norms in human rights leads to 
the validity of them. Consequently the validity of norms in the international sphere 
encompasses universal acceptation of such norms. However, when a norm acquires 
priority upon others and is universally accepted, it becomes a supreme value. Thus it 
may be said that jus cogens influences upon human rights in three aspects: 
supremacy, validity and universality. 
 
3.1. Peremptory human rights as supreme values 
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 The first section to underlie the implications of jus cogens will give “priority to 
those human rights which are common to different cultures among the candidate for 
jus cogens”180. As human rights norms are inherent to human beings, no state would 
deprive its citizens the enjoyment of such rights. And article 53 of the Vienna 
Convention of the Law of the Treaties is clear on this fact, when it stipulates that ‘a 
norm from which no derogation is permitted’. 
 
Despite the limitation of numbers, the implication of jus cogens renders effectively 
human rights superior norms. In the case, for instance, concerning the application of 
the death penalty to juveniles,181 in the USA, the Intern-American Commission on 
human rights had spelled out the principle of superiority of jus cogens norms upon 
others norms. In this case, Terry Roach and Jay Pink were convicted of murder 
committed at a time when they were juveniles.182 Each received a sentence of death 
and were executed in South Carolina and Texas. Before the Commission, the 
applicants had argued that the implementation of the death penalty would constitute a 
violation of the right to life under article 1 and a violation of the right to equality 
before the law under article II of the American Declaration of the right and duties of 
Man. The Commission held that the executions in fact breached both of these 
provisions.183 The Commission insisted that the prohibition of juveniles’ execution 
attained the status of a jus cogens norm, and that this status was recognized by all of 
the states in the inter-American system, including the United States184. What is 
relevant in this case is that, although the Commission recognized in accordance with 
the doctrine of ‘persistent objector’, according to it, if a state has maintained a 
continuous objection to a rule during its emergency as custom, that state is not bound 
by the rule once it has crystallized . In holding that the rule against juvenile 
execution is binding even upon “persistent objectors”, the Commission essentially 
decided that rule of peremptory human rights is superior, consequently nullifying the 
inconsistent rule.  
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3.2. Peremptory human rights and validity of norms 
The second point to emphasize on the content of jus cogens in human rights is that it 
renders them valid vis-à-vis other norms. This character is inherent to jus cogens 
norms. One only needs to read article 53 of the Vienna Convention of the law treaty. 
The first phrase of article 53 reads: a treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it 
conflicts with a peremptory norm of general international law. This feature is very 
significant in the human rights field, since certain human rights instruments are 
considered non-binding. Once a norm of human rights is elevated to the status of jus 
cogens it acquires a binding character, no matter what its sources are. 
 
One can observe that in traditional international law, norms are hierarchically 
ordered regarding their sources. Thus, using a human rights norm stemming from 
inferior sources may not be efficacy. In other words, applying a human rights norm 
originating from non-binding sources may be complicated. However, jus cogens 
norms do not consider such a theory. In the jus cogens regime all norms are equal 
regardless of their sources. Thus, a peremptory norm of human rights originating 
from a non-binding instrument, for instance, will have the same validity as it is a 
treaty, custom or general principles of law.  
 
Another important point that deserves to be mentioned is that jus cogens human 
rights norms entail the idea of equality among human rights norms. While views 
differ concerning the equality of three generations of human rights, peremptory 
norms reconcile them. In a sense all jus cogens norms are equal. It is the case in 
inter-American system where a right to a name is elevated to jus cogens norm.185 It is 
the case of self-determination considered in African system as jus cogens norms. 
Those norms considered as belonging to an inferior generation, elevated in jus 
cogens, they acquire the same validity as their corollary of first generation.  
 
It is important to note that when a norm is christened on jus cogens, it becomes 
generally opposable. It follows that a state is bound by this jus cogens norm 
irrespective of whether or not it has expressed its consent to be bound. This will 
apply also when a state has not taken part in the formation of such a peremptory 
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norm either or because during the process of formation the state in question did not 
exist or because it did not express its position on the emerging rule.186 
 
3.3. Peremptory human rights as rights universally accepted 
As previously spelled out, peremptory human rights are a concern of the international 
community as whole. A particular state or a group of states may not violate such a 
norm in the pretext that they were not party to it. Universal acceptation leads to 
universal jurisdiction. Thus any state may raise the concern of jus cogens human 
rights violations. 
 
It is the case wherein a prospective extraditee may seek to preempt extradition by 
raising the possibility of a jus cogens human rights violations involves by the 
prospective extraditing state looks to the jus cogens nature of violations by the 
prospective extradite. The authorities seeking extradition may contend, as did the 
Belgian authorities with respect to former foreign affairs ministry Yerodia Abdoulay 
Ndombasi ,  that the very  nature of the extradition crimes at issue are of such gravity 
as to vitiate certain otherwise tenable defenses that might be invoked by the 
extradite.187   In such circumstance, the question arises as to whether the jus cogens 
character of the violated norm overrides the principle of underlying the defense. 
 
As mentioned above, there is a close correlation between the concept of jus cogens 
and the obligation erga omnes. While not all obligations erga omnes concern jus 
cogens norms, because they are recognized as peremptory by the international 
community as whole, necessarily give rise to obligation erga omnes.  If these 
overlapping jus cogens norms and obligation erga omnes are indeed the concern of 
the international community, it would seem to follow that the enforcement of the 
positive law prohibiting the violation of a jus cogens rights, i.e. the redress of any 
such violation, falls within the competency of each and every state comprising that 
community. And where such violation constitutes an international crime and so give 
rise to international responsibility, each state should have jurisdiction to prosecute 
those who commit such a crime.  
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It is relevant to argue at this point that the influence of jus cogens on human rights is 
that jus cogens human rights become an interest of the international community as 
whole. Consequently, the violation of such a norm is a concern of all states member 
of international community. Universal acceptation entails also that state may not 
reject the binding character of such a norm, on the ground that it was not party to it.  
 
4. Rules of human rights that can be classified as jus cogens 
As the subject of jus cogens is intimately linked with no-derogability, I have chosen 
to start from non-derogable rights provided by international instruments. It will be 
also possible to mention other jus cogens human rights which international 
instruments did not originally christening them as such.  It is important to notice that 
international practice develops more and more jus cogens human rights norms. Thus 
this examination would not be an exhaustive one. I will discuss the non-derogable 
rights principally in the framework of the ICCPR, while also taking account the jus 
cogens human rights such as developed in international jurisprudences. 
 
4.1. Non derogable rights as jus cogens, 
The ICCPR188 contains provisions allowing state parties to derogate from their full 
obligations in respect of specified rights during declared states of emergency. While, 
on the other hand, this instrument provides that a select group of enumerated rights 
may never be suspended or limited, even during such times of national emergency. 
 
Article 4(1) of the ICCPR provides: 
 
In the time of public emergency with threatens the life of the national and the 
existence of which is officially proclaimed, the state parties to the present 
Covenant may take measures derogating from their obligation under the 
present covenant to the extent strictly required under the exigencies of the 
situation, provided that such measures are not inconsistent with their other 
obligations under international law and do not involve discrimination solely 
on the ground of race, colour, sex, language or social origin. 
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A state party must officially proclaim a state of emergency, in order to undertake 
lawfully a measure of emergency. The proclamation of state of emergency 
constitutes the first condition of derogation. In addition, the state party must notify 
other state parties as the provisions from which it is derogating and the reasons for 
which it is undertaking derogating measures.189 The following rights may no be 
derogated by state member, under no circumstance: the right to life (article 6), 
freedom from torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment  
(article 7), freedom from slavery and servitude (article 8(1 and 2)), freedom from 
imprisonment merely on the ground of inability to fulfill a contractual 
obligation(article 11), freedom from retroactive criminal liability (nullum crimen sine 
lege) (article 15), right to recognition as person before the law (article 16), and the 
right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion (article 18).  
 
Apart from these non-derogable rights, the following rights are considered by 
international law and practice as jus cogens: genocide, slavery or slave trade, the 
murder or causing the disappearance of individuals, torture or other cruel, inhuman, 
or degrading treatment or punishment, prolonged arbitrary detention, systematic 
racial discrimination. I am not going to discus one by one, but will try to give certain 
examples of application of jus cogens in international law case. 
 
4.2 International case law and practice concerning violations of peremptory 
human rights rules 
It is relevant to note that the violations of peremptory norms may be invoked in 
various forums. It may arise before the international forum as well as national forum. 
The international Court of Justice opened the doors to the idea of hierarchy in the 
Barcelona Traction case190 by proposing that basic rights of the human person 
creates obligations erga omnes.191.  The Barcelona Traction case concerned three 
States, Belgium, Canada and Spain. The Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co. 
Ltd, was incorporated in Toronto where it has its base. The Company was declared 
bankrupt subsequent to proceedings company shareholders. The Belgian 
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stockholders could not sue in the international Court of justice, because the Court 
held that only the nationality of the corporation (the Canadians) can sue. The 
Belgium filed the case with the ICJ against Spain, on the ground of diplomatic 
protection. The protection of state nationals was thus in the central of this case. The 
ICJ in this case made an importance contribution by developing human rights, by 
‘drawing the distinction between a state’s obligation towards another state and its 
obligations towards the international community’.192 The court reasoned: 
 
In particular, an essential distinction should be drawn between the obligation 
of state towards the international community as whole, and those arising vis-
à-vis another state in the field of diplomatic protection. By their nature the 
former are the concern of all states. In the view of the importance of the 
rights involved, all states can be held to have a legal interest in their 
protection; they are obligation erga omnes.193 
 
What is striking in this case is that the Court has found that the rules concerning the 
basic rights of person are the concern of all states. It follows from this statement that 
any state may seek vindication when another state is violating the basic rights of a 
person.  Thus the perpetrator state may not bar the action of a claimant state as 
violation of principle of non-intervention in internal affairs. Jus cogens norms are 
thus the concern of all states and they may only derogated by a subsequent jus 
cogens.  
 
In South West Africa Cases,194 Ethiopia and Liberia instituted proceedings against 
South Africa before the International Court. The applicants’ states alleged that South 
Africa, by practicing apartheid in South West Africa, had breached the obligations 
incumbent upon it, as mandatory, under article 22, paragraph 1, of the Covenant of 
the League of Nations and article 22, paragraph 2, of mandate195. Article 22, 
paragraph 1, of the Covenant embodied the guiding principle of all mandates, 
namely; that well-being and development of the people living in a territory under a 
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mandate formed a ‘sacred trust of civilization’. In execution of this principle, article 
2, paragraph 2, of mandate for South West Africa provided that the mandatory 
“would promote the utmost the material and moral well-being and the social 
progress” of the people of South West Africa. 
 
The applicant states contended again that an international custom of ‘non-
discrimination’ or ‘non-separation’ had emerged and was universally accepted. It is 
interesting to note that applicant states held that a norm of ‘non-discrimination’ or 
‘non-separation’ was opposable to all states, irrespective of any claim. 
 
On the merits of the case, the ICJ did not pronounce on the elements such as the 
opposability of customary law binding on all states, and on the prohibition of 
genocide and protection from racial discrimination, in the sense supported by the 
applicant. In reality, the ICJ did not pronounce all merits because it found that the 
applicants did not have standing.196    
 
In his dissenting judgment, Judge Tanaka held that human rights derive from the 
concept of the human being as a person.197 Thus, human rights exist independently of 
the will of states. Judge Tanaka supported his arguments by reference to the advisory 
opinion on genocide Convention198 in which the ICJ had affirmed that the principle 
underlying the convention were binding on states ‘even without any conventional 
obligation’. He then concluded that ‘states which do not recognize this principle (i.e. 
the protection of human rights) or even deny its existence are nevertheless subject to 
its rule.  In this case even though, there is no mention  expresis verbis of jus cogens 
norms, however, expression such as ‘binding all states’, ‘international community 
taken as whole’ do appear to correspond to jus cogens norms. And Judge Tanaka in 
his conclusions underlined the opposability of prohibition of racial discrimination on 
all states. 
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In the case concerning Al-Adsani v United Kingdom,199 there was the tension 
between jus cogens norm of prohibition of torture and the principle of state 
immunity. The case arose from the allegation of Sulaiman Al-Adsani, a British and 
Kuwait national, was tortured in Kuwait by order of Kuwait Sheikh in 1991. Al-
Adsani submitted a civil proceeding in United Kingdom200, for compensation against 
the Sheikh and the state of Kuwait.  The British Court decided to grant immunity to 
Kuwait on the circumstances of the case not constituting an exception to the 
immunity principle under the terms of state immunity act 1978.201 He then decided to 
appeal the decision to the English Court202 of Appeal; the latter dismissed the appeal 
on the grounds of state Immunity. 
 
Then, he decided to lodge an application with the European Court of Human rights 
(ECHR), on the grounds that his right to access to the court (artilce6)203 was violated 
and The UK failed to protect his right not to be tortured.204 The ECHR, while 
recognizing the prohibition of torture is elevated to jus cogens status, the court 
rejected the view that violation of such a norm compels denial of state immunity in 
civil suits205.  I prefer to discuss the decision of the ECHR in the following chapter, 
however it is important to mention decision raised opposing commentary within the 
court itself. On the hand, those who concurred with the judgement, such as judges 
Mattii Pellonpaa and Nocalas Bratza rejected the theory of jus cogens on certain 
grounds. They argued that if the theory were accepted as to jurisdictional immunities, 
it would be also, by logic extended to execution of judgements against foreign state 
defendants, since the laws regarding execution, like state immunity law, are not jus 
cogens either.206 Consequently, the acceptation of jus cogens theory will threaten 
international cooperation between states207. On the other hand, Judges Christos 
Rozakis,Lucius Caflisch, Luzius Wildhaber, Jean-Paul Costa, Ireneu Cabral Barreto, 
and Nina Vajic held that the decision should be based on the normative hierarchy 
theory. They argued “the acceptance of …jus cogens nature of the prohibition of 
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torture entails that a state allegedly violating it cannot invoke hierarchically lower 
rules, to avoid the consequences of the illegality of its action”.208 Furthermore, they 
concluded that ‘Kuwait could not hide behind the rules of state immunity to avoid 
proceedings for serious claim of torture made before a foreign jurisdiction.’209   
 
I espouse the view of the dissenting opinions that Kuwait could not hide behind its 
sovereign immunity to avoid prosecution. And I believe that the procedural character 
of state immunity could not prevent criminal prosecution for violation of peremptory 
norms. In the light of Pinochet, the Court could decide in favour of Al-Adsani and 
rejected the pretension of UK that Kuwait was protecting by state immunity. I will 
develop deeply all these issues raised by the implementation of jus cogens in the next 
chapter. 
   
In Pinochet, the House of Lords had to decide whether to recognize criminal 
jurisdictional immunity for the former President of Chile, General Augusto Pinochet 
Ugarte. 210 Pinochet was in the UK in that time, when the request for his extradition 
was issued by a judge in Spain, where he was facing prosecution for a series of 
criminal offences that constituted violations of human rights, committed during the 
time he governed Chile.211 The Lords decided, in their judgment of 24 March 1999, 
that the international legal system could not confer immunity ratione materiae on 
heads of state regarding criminal jurisdiction for official acts of torture, since it is 
precisely these acts that it intends to criminalize as violations of fundamental norms 
of the international community.212 Thus, in Pinochet case demonstrate that the battle 
peremptory norm prevailed over ordinary norms of jurisdictional immunity of head 
of state. 
 
In the case of the Prosecutor v Anto Furundzija,213 the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) suggested that the violation of a jus 
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cogens norm, such as the prohibition of torture, had direct legal consequences for the 
legal character of all official domestic actions.214   
 
The fact that torture is prohibited by a peremptory norm of international law has 
effects at the inter-state and individuals levels. At the inter-state level, it serves to 
internationally delegitimise any legislative, administrative or judicial act authorizing 
torture… 
 
Furthermore, at individual level, that is, that of criminal liability, it would seem that 
one of the consequence of the jus cogens character bestowed by international 
community upon the prohibition of torture is that every state is entitled to investigate, 
prosecute and punish or extradite individuals accused of torture, who are present in a 
territory under jurisdiction.  
 
This view of the ICTY entails that the jus cogens norm is not only limited to treaty as 
provided by the Vienna Convention, but it concerns also any act of state within its 
territory. It is thus a large view of jus cogens which was only “confined only to 
unlawful international treaty”.215 The second observation from the Furunzidja dictum 
is that violation of jus cogens concerns states as well as individuals.  
 
5. Concluding observations 
Normative hierarchy theory may be defined as mechanisms classifying legal rules 
according to their values, in order to avoid any conflict among of them. These 
mechanisms function differently from one system to another. In traditional 
international law, rules are classified according to their sources. Thus, the famous 
article 38 of status of ICJ hierarchically classifies the norms of international law 
according to their sources. The regime of jus cogens brings a change concerning the 
normative hierarchy theory. In the peremptory norms arena, rules are considered not 
according to their sources but, according to their content and their value. Thus, 
norms which are elevated as peremptory norms are accepted and recognized by 
international community as whole. It is admitted that human rights norms play a 
                                               
214
 Ibid.  
215
 De Wet ‘The prohibition of Torture as an International Norm of Jus Cogens and Its Implications 
for National and Customary Law’ (2004) 15 (1) European Journal of International Law 97-121. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
 54
significant role in the development of jus cogens, and the latter influences human 
rights norms. The introduction of normative hierarchy theory brings certain 
important aspects in human rights, namely the supremacy, validity and universal 
acceptation of peremptory human rights norms. However, the state practice and 
international law cases demonstrate that despite the impressive challenges raised, the 
implication of normative hierarchy theory continues unabatedly.  
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Chapter V: conclusions  
 
The international community has increasingly used jus cogens norms to confirm that 
there are, in international law, certain norms from which no derogation is 
permitted216 and which exist beyond the consent of states. Such norms degenerate 
obligations erga omnes.  From this international practice, there is a trend of using 
normative hierarchy theory in human rights law. Such theory admits the existence of 
a hierarchical status of international rules. 
 
The application of the normative hierarchy theory in human rights law has stimulated 
heated debates, given the fact that human rights law is governed by the principles of 
indivisibility, interdependence and interrelatedness. The indivisibility of human 
rights means that none of the rights are considered to be more important than others, 
more specifically they are interrelated. In this vein, the concept of indivisibility and 
interdependence appears to be incompatible with any notion of hierarchy.217 
 
This thesis has argued that although human rights norms reject hierarchy among 
them, the normative hierarch theory is not new in human rights law. The 
classification, for instance, of human rights norms in three generations is a 
manifestation of the idea of hierarchy theory. Although such classification is only 
recognized by doctrine, it impacts in the practice of the international community. 
Thus for instance, the violations of the rights so-called first generation tend to attract 
the sharpest scrutiny.218  While the second and the third generation rights have 
received consideration, their implementation remains slow-moving.219 Another 
hierarchy theory among human rights norms can be found in the division between 
derogable and non-derogable rights. In this regard, the ICCPR, the ACHR and the 
ECHR contain provisions allowing states parties to derogate from specified rights 
during declared state of emergency. At the same time, these instruments provide that 
select groups of enumerated rights may not be suspended or limited, even during 
national emergency. 
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This thesis, by trying to explore the application of jus cogens in human rights law has 
pointed that jus cogens norms play a significant role in the enforcement of human 
rights law. It argues that normative hierarchy theory seeks to establish cohesion in 
international human rights law in order to avoid any subsequent conflict of norms. 
Thus for instance, non-derogable rights220 take precedence over others human rights. 
This thesis has also argued that jus cogens norm entails universal acceptation of a 
norm elevated to the status of a peremptory norm. This may be justified by the fact 
that there is a proliferation of human rights instruments, some of which are very 
contestable. Therefore, an attempt to upgrade some of them and giving them various 
quality labels on the assumption that the authority of the higher will not be 
impugned.221 Another justification is that there is a conflict between the universality 
and relativity of human rights. Therefore the elevation of certain norms to jus cogens 
status allows them to be universally accepted. In other words, jus cogens norms bind 
states beyond their consent. The Inter-American Commission emphasized the 
principle of universality of jus cogens in the Death Penalty of Juveniles Case222 
holding that even though the USA was not party to the American Convention on 
Human Rights, the prohibition of juveniles’ execution had attained the status of jus 
cogens and the USA was bound by it.  
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